The Cognitive Neuroscience of Memory Distortion  by Schacter, Daniel L. & Slotnick, Scott D.
Neuron, Vol. 44, 149–160, September 30, 2004, Copyright 2004 by Cell Press
ReviewThe Cognitive Neuroscience
of Memory Distortion
distortions: misattribution, suggestibility, and bias. Mis-
attribution occurs when retrieved information is as-
signed to the wrong source (e.g., mistaking a previously
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imagined event for a real one); suggestibility refers to theCambridge, Massachusetts 02138
incorporation of inaccurate information from external
sources, such as misleading questions, into one’s own
memories; and bias involves the distorting influences ofMemory distortion occurs in the laboratory and in ev-
present knowledge, beliefs, and feelings on recollectioneryday life. This article focuses on false recognition,
of previous experience.a common type of memory distortion in which individu-
Cognitive psychologists have long been interested inals incorrectly claim to have encountered a novel ob-
each of the distortion-related sins and have producedject or event. By considering evidence from neuropsy-
much research concerning their properties and impli-chology, neuroimaging, and electrophysiology, we
cations (for reviews, see Johnson et al., 1993; Koriataddress three questions. (1) Are there patterns of neu-
and Goldsmith, 1996; Roediger and McDermott, 2000;ral activity that can distinguish between true and false
Schacter, 2001; Schacter et al., 1998a). Such distortionsrecognition? (2) Which brain regions contribute to false
have interested psychologists because they can providerecognition? (3) Which brain regions play a role in mon-
insight into the constructive nature of memory, revealingitoring or reducing false recognition? Neuroimaging
how bits of information are patched together to formand electrophysiological studies suggest that sensory
memories with varying degrees of accuracy. Cognitiveactivity is greater for true recognition compared to
neuroscientists have, until recently, shown little interestfalse recognition. Neuropsychological and neuro-
in examining memory distortions. During the past de-imaging results indicate that the hippocampus and
cade, however, there has been steadily increasing re-several cortical regions contribute to false recogni-
search on the topic, and a cognitive neuroscience oftion. Evidence from neuropsychology, neuroimaging,
memory distortion is beginning to emerge. Much of thisand electrophysiology implicates the prefrontal cortex
work has focused on the misattribution error called falsein retrieval monitoring that can limit the rate of false
recognition, which occurs when subjects incorrectlyrecognition.
claim that a novel item has been encountered earlier in
an experiment. False recognition is typically inferredIntroduction
from “old” responses to novel items that are conceptu-The scientific analysis of memory would not be possible
ally or perceptually related to previously studied items—if memory were perfect. Experimental and theoretical
that is, false alarms above and beyond the “baseline”analyses of memory typically depend on variations in
level of false alarms to unrelated novel items (cf. Roe-the proportions of items or responses recalled, recog-
diger and McDermott, 1995; Underwood, 1965).nized, or otherwise produced across different condi-
Cognitive neuroscience research during the past de-tions. Such variations, which provide the basis for draw-
cade has used three different approaches to analyzeing inferences about the processes that support memory
false recognition and related forms of memory distor-function, necessarily involve some degree of forgetting.
tion: neuroimaging, electrophysiology, and neuropsy-Beyond this ubiquitous sense in which imperfect reten-
chology. Several studies have used functional neuro-tion is necessary to study memory, observations con-
imaging techniques—positron emission tomography (PET)cerning the nature of forgetting have been conceptually
and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)—in
central to the cognitive neuroscience of memory. For
an attempt to identify specific brain regions associated
example, observations of pathological forgetting after
with true and false recognition. Electrophysiological ac-
damage to the medial temporal lobe (MTL) in human tivity associated with true and false recognition has been
amnesic patients have greatly influenced our current examined using event-related potentials (ERPs), which
understanding of the role of the MTL in various aspects measure changes in voltage topography on the scalp
of memory (Squire and Schacter, 2002). over time. Neuropsychological analyses have focused
Memory’s imperfections, however, are not restricted on brain-damaged patients with lesions to MTL and pre-
to forgetting. Distortions and illusions of memory also frontal regions that have been implicated previously in
occur—that is, there are instances in which some form accurate remembering.
of memory is present, but incorrect. Memory distortions We consider evidence from each of these approaches
can be considered in the context of the proposal that in an attempt to address three main issues that have
memory’s imperfections can be divided into seven basic emerged in the literature during the past decade. First,
categories, or “sins.” (Schacter, 1999, 2001). Three of we examine the evidence that brain activity can distin-
the sins involve different types of forgetting (called tran- guish between true and false memories. From the sub-
sience, absent-mindedness, and blocking), and one re- jective standpoint of an individual engaged in the act of
fers to intrusive, unwanted memories of arousing or trau- remembering, true and false recognition are associated
matic events (persistence). Most relevant to the topic with an identical mnemonic outcome: in both cases,
of the present paper, three of the sins concern memory people believe they are remembering an event that oc-
curred in their past. Therefore, it has been of consider-
able interest to determine whether, and in what sense,*Correspondence: dls@wjh.harvard.edu
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brain activity differs during true and false recognition. Neuroimaging of True and False Recognition
In the first neuroimaging study to compare true and falseWe focus in particular on the hypothesis, tested by sev-
recognition, PET scans were carried out while subjectseral investigators, that true memory, more than false
performed a recognition test that followed study of vari-memory, is preferentially associated with the reactiva-
ous DRM associate lists (Schacter et al., 1996a). Aftertion of sensory/perceptual processing that occurred
auditory presentation of lists containing 20 words thatduring encoding. Second, we examine evidence that
were associates of nonpresented theme words, subjectsaddresses the issue of what kind of brain activity is
were scanned during separate test blocks in which theyassociated with, or responsible for, the generation of
responded separately to true targets (words that hadfalse memories. A number of studies have been particu-
been studied previously), false targets (nonstudied se-larly concerned with the role of MTL structures in the
mantic associates of previously studied items), or targetgeneration of false memories, but recent research has
controls (nonpresented words that were unrelated toalso begun to examine the role of other regions as well.
previously studied words). Compared to a commonThird, we will consider research that has examined what
baseline fixation condition, both true and false recogni-brain regions are involved in monitoring or reducing sus-
tion were associated with blood flow increases in vari-ceptibility to false memories. Much of this research has
ous regions that are commonly activated by episodicfocused on the analysis of regions within prefrontal
retrieval tasks, including dorsolateral/anterior prefron-cortex.
tal, medial parietal, and medial temporal regions. Direct
comparisons indicated greater activation during trueDistinguishing between True and False Memories:
than false recognition in a left temporoparietal regionThe Sensory Reactivation Hypothesis
previously associated with auditory processing and re-Although subjective responses are comparable during
tention. Because subjects had heard true targets—buttrue and false recognition, cognitive studies have pro-
not false targets—during the auditory study phase ofvided some evidence for differences in the nature of the
the experiment, this finding supports the possibility thatrepresentations that support the two forms of memory.
true recognition is preferentially associated with an audi-In particular, several behavioral studies indicate that
tory sensory signature that reflects memory for auditory/true memories are accompanied by retrieval of greater
phonological aspects of previously studied words.sensory/perceptual details than are false memories
In a related study, Schacter et al. (1997a) performed(e.g., Mather et al., 1997; Norman and Schacter, 1997;
a similar experiment using the then newly developedSchooler et al., 1986). Such findings make intuitive sense
event-related fMRI, which allows stimuli from differentbecause true memories engage perceptual encoding
conditions to be mixed together (as opposed to pre-processes that are presumably not involved in the cre-
sented in separate test blocks according to condition,ation of false memories. These findings have therefore
as in PET studies). Their results supported the generalled neuroscientists to ask whether neural activity ac-
conclusion that many of the same or similar patterns ofcompanying true recognition, compared with false rec-
brain activity are observed during both true and falseognition, shows signs of sensory processing or reacti-
recognition (compared to a fixation baseline control).
vation.
However, no regions were found that showed greater
To begin to address the question of whether brain
activation for true than false recognition, not even the
activity can distinguish between true and false memo-
left temporoparietal region observed by Schacter et
ries, experimental paradigms are needed that produce al. (1996a).
robust and reliable memory distortions in the laboratory. These early neuroimaging studies are thus inconclu-
These considerations are especially important for neu- sive regarding the question of whether brain regions
roimaging studies, where it is necessary to obtain suffi- involved in perceptual processing and representation
cient numbers of observations to yield a signal that can are preferentially active during true versus false recogni-
be statistically distinguished from noise. Roediger and tion. Cabeza et al. (2001) capitalized on prior research
McDermott (1995) described such a paradigm. They indicating that differences between true and false recog-
modified and extended a procedure developed initially nition can be increased when perceptual processing
by Deese (1959) in which subjects hear lists of associ- of target materials is increased during encoding (e.g.,
ated words (e.g., candy, sour, sugar, bitter, good, taste, Schacter et al., 1999). Increased perceptual encoding,
tooth, etc.) that all converge on a nonpresented “theme in turn, could be reflected in more discriminable patterns
word” or false target (e.g., sweet). Roediger and McDer- of brain activity during retrieval. To enhance perceptual
mott reported extremely high levels of false recognition encoding, Cabeza et al. instructed subjects (prior to
(e.g., 80%) to the theme words across a variety of word scanning) to try to remember lists of semantically asso-
associate lists. Moreover, the level of false recognition ciated words and also to try to remember the source (a
responses was indistinguishable from the hit rate to man or a woman) who presented the word lists; on a
studied items, and false recognition responses were videotape, half the words were spoken by a man and
accompanied by high confidence. Numerous subse- half were spoken by a woman. They hypothesized that,
quent studies using this Deese-Roediger/McDermott during subsequent retrieval, previously studied words
(“DRM”) paradigm have delineated a variety of behav- but not semantically associated false targets would acti-
ioral and cognitive properties of this powerful false rec- vate regions initially involved in encoding perceptual
ognition effect (e.g., Brainerd et al., 2003; Gallo et al., (i.e., source) information, whereas regions involved in
2001; Mather et al., 1997; Neuschatz et al., 2003; Norman the encoding/retrieval of semantic information would
and Schacter, 1997; Robinson and Roediger, 1997; show comparable activation during the two forms of rec-
ognition.Schacter et al., 1999).
Review
151
Figure 1. Stimuli and Results from Slotnick
and Schacter, 2004
Using event-related fMRI, Cabeza et al. documented also, Posner and Keele, 1968). Moreover, imaging stud-
ies of true recognition for pictorial stimuli, that appeareda dissociation between two regions within the MTL:
parahippocampal gyrus, which showed greater activa- after the early studies of true-false recognition dis-
cussed above, have revealed reactivation during re-tion during true than false recognition, and hippocam-
pus, which showed significant activation during both trieval of some of the same visual processing regions
that have been associated with perceptual processingtrue and false recognition (we discuss this finding further
in the next section of the article). The true  false para- during encoding (Wheeler and Buckner, 2003; Wheeler
et al., 2000). Similar sensory reactivation effects havehippocampal activation suggests greater recovery of
sensory or contextual information during true than false been observed during memory for sounds (Nyberg et
al., 2000; Wheeler et al., 2000) and motor sequencesrecognition (see Bar and Aminoff, 2003).
Further relevant evidence comes from a study by (Nyberg et al., 2001). These observations, coupled with
the suggestive findings considered above from previousOkado and Stark (2003) that used fMRI to compare true
recognition of previously perceived events with false imaging studies of true versus false recognition (Schac-
ter et al., 1996a; Cabeza et al., 2001; Okado and Stark,recognition of previously imagined events (cf. Johnson
and Raye, 1981). Prior to scanning, subjects studied 2003), led Slotnick and Schacter (2004) to hypothesize
that true recognition of previously studied shapes, asverbal labels of common objects followed either by a
picture of the object or instructions to imagine the ob- compared to false recognition of nonstudied related
shapes, would be accompanied by a sensory signatureject. They were subsequently given a “lie test,” intended
to increase the number of source monitoring errors, in involving preferential activation of regions within the
ventral visual processing stream (Mishkin et al., 1983;which they were asked to indicate whether or not they
had previously seen an actual picture of the object, and Felleman and Van Essen, 1991).
Slotnick and Schacter (2004) also inquired about thewere strongly encouraged to lie that they had seen a
picture even when they had not. Subjects were then nature of the hypothesized sensory signature, specifi-
cally, whether observed sensory reactivation effectsscanned during a more standard memory test in which
they indicated whether they had actually seen a picture were accompanied by conscious recollection of sensory
features of studied shapes. As noted earlier, previousof an object during the study phase. Results revealed
that a number of regions showed greater activity during behavioral studies of true versus false recognition have
shown that true recognition is associated with increasedtrue than false recognition, including bilateral occipital
cortices and right parahippocampal gyrus, which the sensory memory (e.g., Mather et al., 1997; Norman and
Schacter, 1997; Schooler et al., 1986), and it has gener-authors suggested reflects greater recovery of percep-
tual information for true than false memories. Okado ally been assumed that such memory reflects conscious
recollection of sensory/perceptual details of previouslyand Stark’s findings concerning parahippocampal gyrus
resemble those reported previously by Cabeza et al. studied items. In contrast, a separate line of research
concerning the phenomenon of perceptual priming sug-(2001).
To examine further the nature of the possible differen- gests that sensory memory can sometimes be ex-
pressed as nonconscious or implicit memory. Percep-tial role for recovery of sensory/perceptual information
during true versus false recognition, a recent event- tual priming occurs when exposure to a stimulus results
in enhanced identification or production of that stimulusrelated fMRI study by Slotnick and Schacter (2004) used
abstract shapes that were expected to engage visual on a later test (Tulving and Schacter, 1990). Priming
can occur in the absence of conscious recollection, asprocessing regions. All shapes in the study phase were
related to nonpresented prototypes, and subjects later demonstrated by behavioral studies of healthy subjects
and by neuropsychological studies showing intact prim-made old/new recognition decisions about previously
studied shapes, nonstudied related shapes, and non- ing in amnesic patients with MTL damage who have
severe deficits in conscious memory (for reviews, seestudied unrelated shapes (see Figure 1A for examples).
Earlier behavioral studies using similar paradigms have Roediger and McDermott, 1993; Schacter and Buckner,
1998). Importantly, priming can reflect memory for sen-shown high levels of false recognition to nonstudied
prototype shapes that are perceptually related to pre- sory attributes of studied items, such as modality of
presentation, and even more specific sensory featuresviously studied shapes (e.g., Koutstaal et al., 1999; see
Neuron
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such as shape of an object or typefont of a word. There- tern of activation for old-hits and old-misses was ob-
served in early visual regions even when subjects saidfore, it is conceivable that sensory reactivation effects
during true recognition could be expressed as priming they were “sure” that they not seen a shape previously,
thus casting doubt on the “threshold” hypothesis. Al-rather than conscious recollection.
Using event-related fMRI, Slotnick and Schacter at- though one must always be cautious in neuroimaging
studies when interpreting an absence of a significanttempted to determine whether activity in visual pro-
cessing regions is specifically related to conscious difference between two conditions, Slotnick and Schac-
ter replicated these results in a follow-up study.memory, which would be indicated by greater activity
during “old” than “new” responses to studied items (see The priming hypothesis might also be questioned be-
cause repetition priming effects in neuroimaging studiesWheeler and Buckner, 2003, 2004). Alternatively, if acti-
vation is comparable during “old” and “new” responses are most commonly expressed by reduced activity in a
particular region during a primed condition comparedto studied items, then it is reasonable to infer that this
activity is associated with a nonconscious or implicit to an unprimed condition (for reviews, see Henson, 2003;
Schacter and Buckner, 1998; Schacter et al., 2004; Wiggsform of memory (see Rugg et al., 1998, for elaboration
of this logic). and Martin, 1998). However, this conclusion is based
primarily on studies in which familiar items are used asBehavioral data revealed that participants made sig-
nificantly more “old” responses to studied shapes than experimental stimuli, such as common words or pictures
of everyday objects. In studies that have used unfamiliarto related nonstudied shapes; although this difference
was small in magnitude, it indicates a somewhat greater materials more akin to the Slotnick and Schacter ab-
stract shapes, such as faces (Henson et al., 2000) ordegree of memory for studied shapes. Critically, they
also made significantly more “old” responses to related drawings of structurally possible and impossible objects
(Schacter et al., 1995), priming-related increases havenonstudied shapes (e.g., prototypes) than to unrelated
nonstudied shapes, confirming the presence of a strong been observed. Although more evidence is required to
fully evaluate the priming hypothesis advanced by Slot-false recognition effect. Analysis of the fMRI results in
cortical regions within the ventral visual processing nick and Schacter, it remains viable in light of known
neuroimaging data concerning priming.stream revealed that, consistent with the sensory reacti-
vation hypothesis, in early visual areas there was signifi- Electrophysiological Differences between True
and False Recognitioncantly greater activity during true than false recognition
(see Figure 1B). By contrast, later visual areas showed Studies using event-related potentials (ERPs), which
measure changes in voltage topography on the scalpcomparable levels of activity during true and false recog-
nition. over time, have been conducted to probe the underlying
neural activity associated with true and false recognitionTo examine further the nature of responses in early
and late visual processing regions, Slotnick and Schac- in real time. Although ERPs do not allow the precise
spatial localization achieved by PET and fMRI, they doter compared activation associated with “old” responses
to studied shapes (old-hits) and “new” responses to permit more fine-grained analyses of the temporal prop-
erties of activity accompanying memory retrieval. More-studied shapes (old-misses). The contrast between old-
hits and old-misses was employed to reveal those re- over, ERP studies have established a foundation of basic
knowledge concerning properties of memory encodinggions associated with conscious memory, as discussed
above. As illustrated in Figure 1C, a striking dissociation and retrieval that are associated with specific aspects
of the ERP waveform. One ERP component that seemswas observed. Compared with the baseline of correct
rejections to new unrelated items, both old-hits and old- especially relevant to the sensory reactivation hypothe-
sis under consideration is a parietal effect (often leftmisses were similarly associated with activity in early
visual processing regions (BA17, BA18). By contrast, lateralized) that occurs within the 400–800 ms range
after stimulus onset and typically shows greater activitythe old-hits greater than old-misses comparison, which
is assumed to reflect conscious memory, was associ- during hits to old items than correct rejections to new
items (Wilding and Rugg, 1996; Donaldson and Rugg,ated specifically with activity in late visual processing
regions (BA19, BA37; we will discuss this finding later 1998; Curran and Cleary, 2003). This parietal effect has
been associated previously with memory for contextual/in the article). Thus, activity in early visual processing
areas may reflect specific memory for a particular shape, perceptual details (Wilding, 2000).
Early studies of ERP effects associated with true andregardless of participants’ conscious judgments of
whether they had seen the item. false recognition used the DRM semantic associates
paradigm and measured ERP activity during retrieval.This conclusion is consistent with the priming hypoth-
esis noted earlier: true and false recognition may be The main message from early ERP studies was that
brain activity during true and false recognition is highlydistinguished by a nonconscious perceptual priming ef-
fect that occurs only for studied items. However, this similar (Du¨zel et al., 1997; Johnson et al., 1997). Johnson
et al. reported some differences under blocked testingidea could be questioned because some old-misses
may have occurred when participants were unsure conditions (i.e., old items and related lures were tested
in separate blocks) that resembled those initially re-about whether they had seen a shape earlier. Thus, the
indistinguishable activations for old-hits and old-misses ported by Schacter et al. (1996a) with PET. However,
those differences were not observed when trial typesin early visual processing regions might be attributable
to “unsure” old-miss responses that were close to the were intermixed, leading Johnson et al. to postulate
that differences in retrieval strategy during blocked and“old” response threshold. That is, rather than represent-
ing a nonconscious priming effect, the old-miss-related intermixed testing accounted for observed true-false
recognition ERP differences.activity observed by Slotnick and Schacter might reflect
vague or weak explicit memory. However, the same pat- As with fMRI, however, more recent ERP studies have
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revealed more consistent true-false recognition differ- Cognitive studies have delineated a range of explana-
tions for different types of memory distortions (for dis-ences. Employing a DRM paradigm, Curran et al. (2001)
cussion, see Alba and Hasher, 1983; Brainerd andmeasured ERPs at test to old words, related words,
Reyna, 1993; Bartlett, 1932; Johnson et al. 1993; Loftus,and new words. They found that the left parietal effect
1993; Roediger, 1996; Roediger et al., 2001; Schacter(400–800 ms) was greater for true recognition (old-hits)
et al., 1998a; Schacter, 1999, 2001). For example, analy-than for false recognition (related-false alarms) in a sub-
ses of the DRM false recognition effect have typicallyset of their subjects (see Curran et al., 2001, for discus-
appealed to the idea that false recognition reflects mem-sion). Fabiani et al. (2000) also used a DRM paradigm,
ory for the general sense or semantic gist of previouslybut presented words at study to the left or right of fixa-
studied lists or that false recognition is based on pre-tion, whereas at test they were presented centrally. At
viously generating a lure item during the study phasecentral and posterior (including parietal) electrodes, a
of the experiment and then failing at test to discriminateparietal effect (210–700 ms) was greater for true recogni-
between the generated lure and studied items.tion as compared to false recognition; furthermore, this
With respect to brain activity, because much evidenceeffect occurred on the scalp contralateral to where the
has implicated the hippocampus and related structuresword was presented at study (i.e., words previously pre-
in the formation and retrieval of true memories, a numbersented in the right hemifield at study elicited effects on
of studies have focused on the possible role of thisthe left scalp, and vice versa). If this parietal effect re-
region in the generation of false memories. Recent stud-flects the same processes as those noted earlier, this
ies have begun to explore the possible contributions ofresult is consistent with the notion that the relatively
other regions, as well as to examine how events thatearly parietal effect reflects perceptual/contextual de-
occur at the time of encoding can result in subsequenttails associated with remembering (Wilding, 2000). Spe-
false memories. In this section, we begin by consideringcifically, these contralateral parietal effects may reflect
neuropsychological studies of amnesic patients withreactivation of contralateral visual processing regions
MTL damage. We then consider neuroimaging studiesduring memory for the lateralized word from study, as
of memory retrieval, and conclude with recent studiesin the previously discussed memory-related sensory re-
that have focused on encoding.activation reported with fMRI. If so, these true greater
False Recognition and Amnesic Patientsthan false recognition memory related effects would par-
Using the DRM semantic associates procedure de-allel the differential sensory effects reported by Slotnick
scribed earlier, Schacter et al. (1996b) gave amnesicand Schacter (2004). Further supporting this suggestion,
patients and matched controls lists of semantic associ-some evidence suggests that this differential ERP activ-
ates and tested their recognition of studied and non-ity for true and false recognition may not have been
studied words. Amnesic patients, as expected, showedaccessible to conscious awareness, because partici-
reduced levels of veridical recognition memory com-pants in a similar study were not able to reliably identify
pared to the matched controls: the amnesics attainedthe side of initial presentation (Gratton et al., 1997).
fewer hits than controls to words that had actually ap-Similar to the Curran et al. (2001) and Fabiani et al.
peared on the lists and also made more false alarms(2000) studies just described, the true greater than false
than controls to new words that were unrelated to therecognition parietal effect has been shown to be consis-
words from the study lists. These findings are typical oftent across a number of studies employing semantic
recognition memory experiments with amnesic patients.associative word lists, categorized word lists, unrelated
The more informative result involved false recognition ofword lists, and unrelated picture sets (Nessler et al.,
semantic associates. In comparison to normal controls,2001; Nessler and Mecklinger, 2003; Walla et al., 2000;
amnesic patients made significantly fewer false alarmsEndl et al., 1999). To the extent that the parietal effect
to nonpresented theme words. Thus, amnesics wereis a marker for sensory reactivation during memory re-
less susceptible to false recognition of associatively re-trieval, these differential true greater than false recogni-
lated words, even though they made more false alarms
tion sensory reactivation effects likely map directly onto
to unrelated words than did normal controls (see also
the differential true greater than false recognition sen-
Melo et al., 1999; Schacter et al., 1998b). Schacter et
sory reactivation effects discussed with fMRI (Schacter al. (1997b) compared false recognition of nonstudied
et al., 1996a; Cabeza et al., 2001; Slotnick and Schacter, words that were related either conceptually (e.g.,
2004). Moreover, the ERP results suggest that these “twister,” “funnel”) or perceptually (e.g., “hate,” “mate”)
effects occur relatively early in time, likely before a man- to previously studied words. In two experiments, amne-
ual response is made (which usually takes about 1 s in sic patients showed similarly reduced levels of false
these tasks; e.g., Endl et al., 1999; Fabiani et al., 2000; recognition for perceptually and conceptually related
Nessler et al., 2001; Nessler and Mecklinger, 2003). nonstudied words, thus extending the earlier results.
Thus, the differential true versus false recognition sen- Koutstaal et al. (1999) examined false recognition of
sory effects appear to be relatively fast in nature. Such abstract visual patterns in amnesic patients, using a
converging evidence from ERP and fMRI studies pro- prototype recognition procedure that is similar in some
vides confidence that some form of the sensory reactiva- respects to the paradigm used in Slotnick and Schac-
tion hypothesis is viable. ter’s (2004) fMRI study described earlier. Koutstaal et al.
found robust false recognition to prototypes in control
Brain Regions that Support False Memories: subjects, together with significantly reduced false rec-
Clues from Neuropsychology and Neuroimaging ognition of prototypes in amnesic patients.
One of the fundamental questions concerning false A parallel series of studies on false recognition has
memories centers on why they occur at all: why should been reported in patients with Alzheimer’s disease (AD),
who are generally characterized by neuropathology thatpeople claim to remember events that never happened?
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includes, but is not limited to, MTL regions. AD patients levels of specific recollection, amnesic and AD patients
are likely to show greater false recognition than controls,typically exhibit patterns of episodic memory perfor-
mance that are generally similar to those seen in amne- because only the controls can use specific information
to oppose or reduce gist-based false alarms (see also,sic patients. Results thus far from AD patients are highly
similar to those from amnesics: compared with age- Budson et al., 2002; Verfaellie et al., 2004).
Neuroimaging of True and False Recognitionmatched controls, AD patients show reduced false rec-
ognition of lure items that are either semantically or Although the foregoing studies are consistent with the
idea that the MTL can contribute to the generation ofperceptually related to previously studied items (Balota
et al., 1999; Budson et al., 2000, 2001, 2003). some types of false memories, there are limits on the
neuroanatomical specificity of the conclusions that canOne interpretation of the foregoing results is that
healthy controls form and retain a well-organized repre- be drawn from such studies, since lesions in amnesic
patients are rarely limited to specific regions within thesentation of the semantic or perceptual gist of a list of
related study items (cf. Payne et al., 1996; Reyna and MTL and brain damage in AD patients typically extends
to other regions. Functional neuroimaging studies holdBrainerd, 1995; Schacter et al., 2001). Lure items that
match semantic or perceptual features of this represen- the promise for more precise spatial localization.
Early neuroimaging evidence suggested comparabletation are likely to be falsely recognized; unrelated words
that do not match it are likely to be correctly rejected. activation of MTL structures during true and false recog-
nition (Schacter et al., 1996a, 1997a). However, theseAs a result of MTL damage, amnesic and AD patients
may form and retain only a weak or degraded gist repre- findings emerged from contrasting true and false recog-
nition with a low-level fixation baseline and thus providesentation. Thus, patients are less likely than controls to
make false alarms to semantic associates or perceptu- relatively weak evidence for the hypothesis that activa-
tion of MTL structures contributes significantly to falseally similar items (because there is little information for
theme words to match) and are more likely than controls recognition. More compelling evidence was provided by
Cabeza et al. (2001), who found significant activation ofto make false alarms to unrelated new items (because
the degraded gist representation does not allow amne- the hippocampus during both true and false recognition
in the DRM paradigm compared with a control conditionsic and AD patients to easily exclude words that do
not match the theme or gist of the list). These findings in which subjects responded to unrelated lure words.
Moreover, whereas hippocampal activations were indis-therefore suggest that the MTL structures that are dam-
aged in amnesic and AD patients may participate in tinguishable during true and false recognition, as noted
earlier, parahippocampal gyrus showed greater activa-storing the gist information that underlies false recogni-
tion in the foregoing paradigms. tion during true than false recognition, pointing toward
a dissociation among MTL structures. More recently,An alternative possibility is that on a standard recogni-
tion memory test, which probes memory for specific Slotnick and Schacter (2004) also reported some evi-
dence for hippocampal activity during both true andindividual items, amnesic and AD patients fail to retrieve
or gain access to relatively intact gist representations. false recognition compared with responses to unrelated
control items. Thus, while further neuroimaging data arePerhaps gist information is available and could be ac-
cessed by patients if a test were to probe gist memory required to settle the issue, there is evidence consistent
with the idea that hippocampal activation during re-directly. Evidence bearing on this point comes from a
study by Verfaellie et al. (2002) that used a modified trieval may contribute to the generation of false mem-
ories.version of the DRM semantic associates procedure in
which participants are instructed to call “old” any item Slotnick and Schacter (2004) reported stronger evi-
dence implicating other regions in the generations ofthat is semantically related to the theme or gist of a
previously studied list, even if the item itself had not false memories. As noted earlier, they found evidence
for activation of early and late visual processing regionsappeared on the list. Evidence from healthy control parti-
cipants suggests that such a task provides a more direct during both true recognition of studied shapes and false
recognition of related shapes, compared with correctprobe of gist information than a standard old/new recog-
nition task (Brainerd and Reyna, 1998; Koutstaal, 2003; rejection of unrelated new shapes (but only the late
visual processing regions showed comparable activa-Schacter et al., 2001). Verfaellie et al. (2002) reported
that, even on this “meaning test,” amnesic patients pro- tion during true and flase recognition). Moreover, when
they further examined responses to studied shapes byvide fewer “old” responses to semantically related lure
words than do controls, thereby supporting the idea of contrasting old-hits with old-misses (a significant differ-
ence in this contrast was assumed to reflect consciousa degraded gist representation.
There are, however, conditions in which amnesic and memory), they found greater activity in the late visual
processing regions (BA19, BA37) during old-hits thanAD patients show greater false recognition than control
subjects. When DRM lists are repeatedly studied and old misses (Figure 1C). Slotnick and Schacter found a
similar pattern of activity in a left parietal region thattested, allowing control subjects to build up detailed
memories of the specific words they encountered, their has recently been implicated in endorsing items as “old”
(Wheeler and Buckner, 2003). These findings raise thefalse recognition rates drop considerably, to a level be-
low that of amnesic and AD patients (Budson et al., possibility that a network of regions, perhaps a subset of
those activated during true recognition, become active2000; Schacter et al., 1998b). With repeated study and
test, patients build up their degraded gist representation during false recognition and contribute to the generation
of an “old” response. However, this hypothesis must bebut do not develop specific memories of list items, re-
sulting in increased false recognition. This finding high- regarded as tentative at the present time. Further studies
using the type of old-hit versus old-miss contrast re-lights that when experimental conditions promote high
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ported by Slotnick and Schacter will be needed before retrieval and monitoring or verifying the source of memo-
ries (e.g., Dobbins et al., 2002, 2003; Henson et al., 1999;the issue can be settled (for additional fMRI findings
Rugg et al., 1999). Here we first consider evidence fromconcerning subjective experience and retrieval of epi-
neuropsychological studies that have documented in-sodic memories, see Eldridge et al., 2000).
creased false recognition in patients with damage toEncoding Studies and the Formation
various regions within prefrontal cortex. Then we con-of False Memories
sider relevant findings from neuroimaging studies.Further clues concerning how brain activity contributes
False Recognition and Frontal Lobe Damageto the generation of false memories are provided by
Although neuropsychologists have long been interestedstudies that have examined the role of encoding pro-
in memory distortions such as confabulation, where pa-cesses. Upon first consideration, the notion that encod-
tients generate detailed recollections of events thating processes are related to subsequent false memories
never happened (e.g., Burgess and Shallice, 1996; Dabmay seem odd or even nonsensical: false memories
et al., 1999; Johnson, 1991; Moscovitch, 1995; Talland,refer to inaccurate recollections of events that never
1965), during the past decade several groups have re-happened, so it makes little sense to talk about how
ported detailed studies of patients with damage to re-encoding processes influence such memories. How-
gions in the frontal lobes, who exhibit heightenedever, it is known that events during encoding can influ-
false recognition.ence false recognition rates in the DRM paradigm (e.g.,
One of the first such cases was reported by Delbecq-Arndt and Reder, 2003; Schacter et al., 1999). Moreover,
Derouesne et al. (1990). They described a patient, RW,in reality monitoring paradigms where false recognition
who suffered a ruptured aneurysm of the anterior com-occurs because subjects incorrectly claim to have seen
municating artery (which typically results in damage toan item they only imagined (e.g., Johnson and Raye,
the frontal lobes as well as basal forebrain). RW made1981), subjects do actually encode a specific event (per-
large numbers of false alarms on recognition tests andceiving or imagining objects), so it is possible to examine
expressed considerable confidence in his erroneoushow brain activity during this event is related to subse-
memories. Schacter et al. (1996c) reported pathologicalquent recognition performance.
false recognition in a patient (BG) who had suffered anGonsalves and Paller (2000) recorded ERPs while sub-
infarction restricted to the right frontal lobe. For exam-jects viewed pictures of common objects or generated
ple, after BG studied a list of common words, memoryimages of objects. On a later source monitoring test,
for previously studied words (i.e., hit rate) was relativelywhen subjects were required to indicate whether an
normal, but he made many more false alarms (claimingobject had earlier been perceived or imagined, they
to recognize a word that did not actually appear in thesometimes claimed incorrectly that they had perceived
study list) than did any of the eight matched controlan object that they had only imagined. Posterior ERPs
subjects. Schacter et al. found that BG exhibited in-at encoding were more positive when subjects falsely
creased false recognition relative to matched controlsrecognized pictures that they had only imagined, per-
when he was tested with pseudowords, environmentalhaps reflecting more vivid visual imagery at encoding
sounds, or words that are either associatively relatedfor items later subject to false recognition. In a more
or unrelated to previously studied words. However, theyrecent fMRI version of this study, Gonsalves et al. (2004)
also found a way to reduce BG’s false recognition re-again scanned subjects during encoding while viewing
sponses. After showing BG a study list consisting ofpictures or generating images of objects. Gonsalves et
pictures of inanimate objects from various categoriesal. found that false memories of having seen imagined
(e.g., furniture, articles of clothing), on the subsequentobjects were predicted by activation, at the time of en-
recognition test, he was presented with items that werecoding, in regions associated with visual imagery and
on the study list as well as new items that did not appearspatial attention, including precuneus and inferior pari-
in the study list. Some of these new items were members
etal cortex. Presumably, the engagement of such re-
of the categories used in the study list, others came
gions during encoding reflected greater perceptual de-
from miscellaneous categories of inanimate objects that
tail associated with the visual mental image, making it were not represented on the study list, and still others
more difficult for subjects to distinguish true from false were animate objects (i.e., animals). BG claimed to rec-
memories on the later test. ognize many of the new items that were drawn from
previously studied categories of inanimate objects, but
Monitoring and Reduction of False Memories: he almost never said he recognized nonstudied items
A Role for Prefrontal Cortex? that were not members of previously studied categories.
The preceding section examined some of the brain re- False recognition was thus restricted to items associated
gions that contribute to the formation or generation of with the previously studied categories. Thus, Schacter et
false memories. However, it is important to keep in mind al. (1996c) suggested that when making a recognition
that memory is often accurate; false memories, though decision BG relies excessively on the global correspon-
important when they occur, are by no means the domi- dence between a test item and previously studied
nant outcome of memory retrieval. From this perspec- words. Follow up experiments with BG (Curran et al.,
tive, we can ask about regions that may contribute to 1997) suggested that impaired retention of specific infor-
reducing or avoiding false memories. Much attention mation about individual items on the list contributed to
has been focused on regions within prefrontal cortex, his overreliance on general features of the study ep-
in part because a good deal of recent neuroimaging isode.
work has implicated a subset of prefrontal regions in We must be cautious about drawing general conclu-
sions from this single case study, especially regardingstrategic retrieval activities, such as specifying cues for
Neuron
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the role of the right frontal lobe in false recognition. For tients, reduced their false alarms after five repetitions.
Verfaellie et al. (2004) reported on a mixed group ofinstance, Parkin et al. (1996) reported elevated false
recognition in a patient, JB, who had suffered a ruptured patients with unilateral left, right, or bilateral frontal dam-
age. Patients studied categorized lists of words, withanterior communicating artery aneurysm that produced
left frontal lobe damage. A series of experiments re- either one, four, or eight category members presented
on the study list. Although both patients and controlsvealed a performance profile that in many respects re-
sembled that of right frontal patient BG: false recognition showed increased false alarms to related lures with in-
creasing category size, there were no overall group dif-of nonpresented materials was consistent across vari-
ous types of materials and accompanied by high confi- ferences. However, subsequent analyses revealed that
a subset of frontal patients did show excessive falsedence but was nearly eliminated when lure items were
perceptually dissimilar to studied items. Subsequent re- alarming; analysis of lesion data indicated no clear dif-
ference between these patients and those who showedsearch with this same patient (Parkin et al., 1999) sug-
gested that JB’s problems result from a poorly focused normal false alarm responses.
Thus, while the literature clearly establishes that someretrieval description that is normally used to guide mem-
ory search (Burgess and Shallice, 1996; Schacter et al., patients with frontal lobe damage do show heightened
false recognition under some conditions, the phenome-1998a). The poorly focused retrieval description, in turn,
was linked to encoding deficits that resulted in generic non is not observed in all such patients in all conditions.
Further work will be necessary to decide between theo-representations of target items that lack specific details.
In any event, the overall pattern of results suggests that, retical hypotheses that have been proposed to account
for the observed deficits.when making recognition judgments, patients JB and
BG both rely too much on global similarities between Neuroimaging of Frontal Function during True
and False Recognitionstudy and test items, probably reflecting deficits in stra-
tegic retrieval/monitoring operations combined with As noted earlier, it is well established that a variety
of prefrontal regions show increased activation duringsome encoding problems.
Rapcsak and his collaborators have provided addi- standard recognition memory tests. Several of the pre-
viously reviewed PET and fMRI studies of false recogni-tional evidence for strategic retrieval deficits in studies
that focused on false recognition of faces in patients tion during the DRM and related paradigms have also
reported evidence for activation of several prefrontalwith frontal lobe damage. Early studies by Rapcsak’s
group demonstrated that patients with various types of regions during false recognition, and in some cases,
greater activation during false than true recognition.frontal lobe lesions were prone to high levels of false
recognition when presented with unfamiliar faces (e.g., Schacter et al. (1996a) reported that a region in the
dorsolateral/anterior prefrontal cortex, which has beenRapcsak et al., 1996). Subsequent experiments by Rap-
csak et al. (1999) indicated that frontal patients often associated with retrieval monitoring (e.g., Rugg et al.,
1996; Dobbins et al., 2002, 2003), showed greater activ-failed to engage in strategic or effortful retrieval monitor-
ing operations that are required when erroneous recog- ity during false than true recognition, perhaps reflecting
the need for evaluation or monitoring of the strong sensenition decisions can be based on a general sense of
familiarity with a face. This misleading influence of famil- of familiarity produced by false targets. Schacter et al.
(1997a) found some trends indicating greater activationiarity can be triggered by the automatic activation of
contextual information that matches the previously en- of right anterior prefrontal cortex during false than true
recognition, again suggesting a role for retrieval moni-countered faces. However, when patients were specifi-
cally instructed to use stricter decision criteria that pro- toring processes during false recognition. Consistent
with this suggestion, analyses of event-related timeduced more careful retrieval monitoring and were thus
less likely to be unduly influenced by misleading familiar- courses indicated a delayed onset for anterior prefrontal
activity during both true and false recognition comparedity, false recognition of faces was greatly reduced. In
fact, false recognition in the frontal patients now no with other brain regions. Although various interpreta-
tions of this observation are possible (see Schacter etlonger differed from that of control subjects. Ward and
collaborators have documented a similar type of false al., 1997a), it is consistent with the idea that anterior
prefrontal activity reflects a late-occurring evaluation orfacial familiarity in a detailed case study of a patient,
MR, whose facial recognition problems were associated monitoring of the products of retrieval. Cabeza et al.
(2001) and Slotnick and Schacter (2004) provided addi-with damage to the left frontal lobe (Ward et al., 1999;
Ward and Jones, 2003). tional evidence for greater activation of right prefrontal
cortex during false than true recognition (see also, vonIn addition to these case reports, group studies have
also been reported. Swick and Knight (1999) reported Zerssen et al., 2001).
In a different type of false recognition paradigm,increased false alarms to unrelated new items in a group
of patients with damage to dorsolateral prefrontal cortex Treyer et al. (2003) used PET to scan subjects during a
continuous recognition paradigm in which participants(10 left, 1 right), which they attributed to an excessively
lenient response criterion. Budson et al. (2002) used the viewed a series of pictures, some of which were re-
peated, and were instructed to respond “no” to newDRM paradigm in a study of 13 patients with lesions to
dorsolateral frontal cortex (7 right, 5 left, 1 bilateral). pictures and “yes” to repeated ones. After the initial run,
the same pictures were presented again in a separateThese frontal patients showed similar levels of false rec-
ognition to controls after a single study and test session run. Subjects were instructed to disregard whether a
picture appeared in an earlier run and respond “yes”but showed significantly higher levels of false recogni-
tion than controls after five study/test repetitions. This only to picture recurrences within the same run. Thus,
in this paradigm, false recognition reflects a failure topattern occurred because controls, but not frontal pa-
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remember exactly when an item was encountered pre- episodic memory. Using a categorized pictures para-
digm in which healthy controls frequently show falseviously. The key finding of the study was that a left
orbitofrontal region showed increased activation under recognition of related lures (nonstudied pictures from
studied categories), Simons et al. found reduced falsetask conditions that required subjects to make this diffi-
cult source discrimination to avoid false recognition. recognition of related lures in semantic dementia pa-
tients despite normal memory for studied pictures. AThis finding was deemed especially important because
this region is often damaged (along with MTL structures) further experiment indicated normal false recognition to
related lures (and intact true recognition) when meaning-in confabulating amnesic patients who are especially
susceptible to source memory confusions on this task less shapes were used. Taken together, the results sug-
gest that anterolateral temporal cortex is necessary for(Schnider, 2001; Schnider and Ptak, 1999).
ERP Evidence for a Late Frontal Component some aspect of memory for semantic gist, but not per-
ceptual gist (or item-specific memory). Given these re-We have discussed studies suggesting that a relatively
early parietal component of the ERP waveform is related sults, it would be highly desirable to now initiate neuro-
imaging studies with similar paradigms that examine theto sensory reactivation of studied items. In addition,
ERP studies of recognition memory have revealed a later distinction between semantic versus perceptual gist,
further probing the role of anterolateral temporal cortex.(often right lateralized) frontal effect that occurs within
1000–1600 ms after stimulus onset and is thought to be Using this type of approach, we are hopeful that the
cognitive neuroscience of memory distortion will pro-related to postretrieval monitoring. Several ERP studies
have provided evidence that the late-occurring frontal gress even more rapidly during the coming decade than
it has during the last.component is similar for true and false recognition (Du¨-
zel et al., 1997; Curran et al., 2001; Nessler et al., 2001;
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